三、美国做法与WTO 的相关规定
美国最近修改了其对非市场经济国家单独税率的政策,规定只有在出口企业能够证明其出口行为在法律上,或者事实上没有被政府控制的情况下(…a firm can demonstrate an absence of both de jure and de facto governmental control over its export activities.),才可以给予单独税率。新修改的政策还对出口企业申请单独税率规定了详细的程序和要求。
美国商务部出台新政策前,征求了各方的意见。公平贸易局在两次评论意见中都指出了美国的这种做法违反了其在WTO 框架下承诺的义务。
支持此政策的美国国内企业代表的评论意见中,支持的理由均为给予非市场经济国家单独税率将导致中国的出口商可以从获得低税率的企业出口,从而规避反倾销税。
根据以上对欧盟法律的分析,美国的立法目的仍然是规避反倾销税的考虑,不是 WTO 法律框架下《反倾销协议》第 9.2 条的“impracticable”。WTO 法律文件和中国入世法律文件中涉及非市场经济的条款中没有关于出口价格认定的规定。因此,美国的做法与 WTO 规定不符。
附:相关法律条文
GATT 1947 第 6 条第 1 款:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability.*
此条的注释和补充规定:
2. It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.
WTO 反倾销协议第 2.7 条和第 6.10 条:
2.7 This Article is without prejudice to the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994.
6.10 The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.
中国加入议定书第 15 条:
15. Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumping
Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and the SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving imports of Chinese origin into a WTO Member consistent with the following:
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation in determining price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply; however, if there are special difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside China.
(c) The importing WTO Member shall notify methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (a) to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and shall notify methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (b) to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector.